THE US IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
PREPARING FOR WAR

I. THE US MILITARIZATION OF THE REGION
II. THE "COVERT" WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA

'Central America Demands Respect'
I. THE MILITARIZATION OF THE REGION

The course of events so far this year shows that the Reagan administration is not interested in a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Central America. Ignoring all offers of negotiations, the Administration has embarked on a massive build-up of military force in the region. This has involved both the direct presence of U.S. military forces at an unprecedented level, and the intensive strengthening of the militaries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, as well as their unification in a revived CONDECA (Central American Defense Council). Honduras in particular is being turned into a U.S. base. Moreover, the destructive activities of the U.S.-sponsored contras (counter-revolutionaries attacking Nicaragua) have escalated to new heights, as evidenced by their recent attack on Nicaragua's port of Corinto, which left much of Nicaragua's oil-handling and storage facilities ablaze.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE U.S. BUILD-UP IN 1983

JANUARY
The House Foreign Affairs Committee approves $6.3 million in military aid to Guatemala, ending a long-standing Congressional ban on military aid to that country.

FEBRUARY
The first of the joint U.S.-Honduran maneuvers known as "Big Pine" are held. Involving 4,000 Honduran and 1,600 U.S. troops (including units of the Puerto Rico National Guard), these maneuvers are larger than any held prior to this time. They take place near the Nicaraguan border, and shortly after these maneuvers contra attacks from Honduras into Nicaragua escalate dramatically. ($5.7 million worth of military supplies are left in Honduras by the U.S. at the end of the maneuvers.)

Towards the end of the month, the Administration begins a drive for massive "supplemental" appropriations for military aid to El Salvador.

MARCH
A new military plan for conducting the war in El Salvador is announced. Known as CONARA (National Commission to Restore Areas) it will be the first attempt to implement "modern" counter-insurgency warfare by the Salvadoran military, and is closely modeled on the CORDS program used in Vietnam.

APRIL
High U.S. officials reveal that U.S. AWACS planes are conducting regular intelligence missions over Nicaragua. The U.S.-sponsorship of the contras, and their intent of overthrowing the Sandinistas, is by now well-documented public knowledge.

On April 18, Gen. García resigns as Defense Minister of El Salvador, and Gen. Vides Cassanova is appointed to replace him. He rapidly shows himself to be very eager to implement the "suggestions"
of U.S. advisors as to how to conduct the war.

On April 20, the Miami Herald reports that "air strikes under certain conditions" are one of the policy options for Nicaragua being considered by the Reagan administration.

On April 27, Pres. Reagan addresses a joint session of Congress, where he re-emphasizes the Administration's hard line stand.

MAY

The restructuring of the Salvadoran military along lines recommended by U.S. advisors begins. On May 27, it is announced that the State Department's senior official for Latin America, Thomas Enders, is to be replaced by Langdon Motley. The move is widely interpreted as indicating a further hardening of the Reagan administration's line on Central America.

On May 29, the U.S. signs a pact with Gen. Alvarez, the head of the Honduran military, to establish a base at Puerto Cortes in Honduras, where the U.S. will train Salvadoran troops.

JUNE

On June 10, "Operation Well-Being for San Vicente" begins. This is the first phase of the counter-insurgency campaign in El Salvador, and involves 6,000 Salvadoran troops and 30 U.S. advisors, who play a major role in the direction of the campaign.

120 U.S. Green Berets arrive in Honduras in the second week of June to train Salvadoran troops.

(Another 116 are stationed there to train Honduran and other Central American forces.) A radar station is built in Honduras, staffed by 60 U.S. Air Force personnel.

In mid-month, Reagan announces the commitment of a 25-man military medical mission to El Salvador which arrives there by the end of the month. Also in June, the first of 525 Salvadoran officers arrive at Ft. Benning, Ga., for training.

Near the end of June, the Honduran Congress protests that it has not been consulted regarding the training base for Salvadorans, but the Green Berets have already arrived, so a face-saving "approval" is granted.

JULY

On July 19, the New York Times reports that major U.S. military maneuvers in Central America are being planned. Officially described as "routine," they are intended as an intimidating show of force to the Sandinistas, and raise the threat of a blockade. Ironically, on the same day, at a celebration of the fourth anniversary of the Nicaraguan revolution, Daniel Ortega proposes the broadest plan for negotiations yet made. Two days later Reagan tells the Washington press corps that it "has been extremely difficult" to bring peace to Central America as long as the Sandinistas remain in power.

On July 25, the USS Ranger aircraft carrier battle group arrives off the Pacific coast of Nicaragua.

In early July, Phase 2 of the counter-insurgency campaign in El
Salvador begins as troops pour into Usulután province.

**AUGUST**

In early August, the "Big Pine II" maneuvers begin; they are scheduled to last for at least six months. Many permanent structures are being built as part of these "maneuvers". A second radar station is being built in the Gulf of Fonseca (between Nicaragua and El Salvador). Also as part of the "maneuvers", communication centers and roads are being built and airstrips expanded. A $150 million U.S. military base is in the survey stage near Puerto Castilla. The permanent infrastructure for a long-term U.S. military presence is being built under the cover of these "maneuvers".

After the initial "build-up" stage described above, joint maneuvers are planned, with the U.S. troop presence to peak in November when over a thousand U.S. soldiers will participate in amphibious operations. U.S. ground forces are building up for these exercises. At the same time, the U.S. Navy will conduct operations off both coasts of Central America.

The Aug. 8 coup in Guatemala brings to power Gen. Mejia Victores, who calls Reagan's Central America policy "most correct".

On Aug. 16, the Coral Sea aircraft carrier battle group arrives off the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. Soon after, the battleship New Jersey and support ships replace the Ranger.

**SEPTEMBER**

On Sept. 12, Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ickle gives the strongest statement yet made as to the intentions of the Reagan administration: "Let me make this clear to you: We do not seek a military
defeat for our friends. We do not seek a military stalemate. We seek victory for the forces of democracy."

**OCTOBER**

The *New York Times* of Oct. 2 reveals that supplies for the contras are regularly flown out of Ilopango airport in El Salvador under the supervision of the C.I.A.

On Oct. 3 the revival of CONDECA is announced.

On Oct. 5, a high Reagan official announces that the U.S. plans an expanded presence in Honduras after the current exercises end in March. He also states that further joint exercises with the Hondurans are being planned for next year.

On Oct. 11, the contras stage an attack on the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, destroying oil-handling facilities, export products, food and medical supplies. Nicaragua is left with only a one-month supply of oil. Exxon announces it will no longer lease oil tankers to Mexico, Nicaragua's sole oil supplier, because Mexico cannot guarantee the tankers' safety from contra attacks.

On Oct. 21, after one day's consideration, the U.S. rejects Nicaragua's latest peace proposals as being "deficient".

On Oct. 25, U.S. troops invade Grenada, citing the "internal power vacuum" and a request for assistance from other Caribbean nations as justification. Is Nicaragua next?

The strategy of regional militarization currently being implemented in Central America has resulted from a combination of two immediate factors, the Reagan administration's desire to destroy Nicaragua's revolutionary government and the continued strength of the revolutionary forces of El Salvador. In addition, the military government of Guatemala faces a revolutionary movement of its own, which it has only been able to contain through a series of brutal counter-insurgency campaigns that have left thousands dead and made refugees of hundreds of thousands. There are also signs of guerrilla activity in Honduras. And Costa Rica, long the stabllest country in Central America, is increasingly being drawn into the conflict. As a band of contras attacks Nicaragua from its territory, the Costa Rican economy deteriorates. More than ever, the crisis is becoming regional.

Wally Babcock

---

The CUSLAR Newsletter provides CUSLAR members and other concerned individuals with the opportunity to present information and analysis on topics pertaining to Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, the positions of the articles in the newsletter do not necessarily reflect the positions taken by CUSLAR as an organization.
II. THE "COVERT" WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA

Since the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency, American foreign policy as exercised in Central America has consisted of an often bewildering mixture of official policy statements and the reality of their implementation. The confusion surrounding the Reagan policy in Central America stems from its multifaceted and contradictory nature. However, careful consideration of this policy, its chronological unfolding, and the links between its various parts, reveals that it has been both coherent and transparent. Although President Reagan and his advisors have stated that they are committed to peace in the region — unlike their Soviet and Cuban "enemies" and their "surrogates" who ostensibly promote violence and instability — they have from the beginning, adhered quite closely to the "principles" enunciated in the Republican Party Platform.

"We deplore the Marxist-Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua and the Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras ... We oppose the Carter administration aid program for the government of Nicaragua. However, we will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government ... We will return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies, without apology."

In short order, the Nicaraguan Government found itself the target of a combined economic boycott and withdrawal of aid. As military and economic assistance to U.S. client military regimes such as El Salvador and Guatemala rapidly increased, the level of the rhetoric directed at the Sandinistas escalated proportionately. In particular, repeated accusations that Nicaragua was supplying arms and ammunition to the liberation forces in El Salvador became the justification for each new blow directed at the Nicaraguan people. In February, 1981, the State Department released its famous "White Paper" which purportedly proved administration claims concerning the alleged arms trafficking. This "White Paper" was soon exposed as little more than a collection of falsehoods and forgeries. Not only were these revelations an embarrassment for the Reagan administration; since the "White Paper" proof has yet to be furnished by the administration that the source of arms for the left wing forces in El Salvador is Nicaragua. Nevertheless, "stopping the arms flow" has continued to be the primary justification for U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Covert action against Nicaragua began very early on in the Reagan administration. On November 16, 1981, the National Security Council adopted a ten-point pro-
gram including aid for the anti-Sandinista paramilitary forces. An initial CIA budget ($19 million) was approved to finance covert activities aimed at Nicaragua. The original size of the counterrevolutionary force was set at 500. In December, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees were for the first time apprised by the CIA of the Contras' existence and of the aid given them by the U.S. Reagan signed a "Presidential Finding" (authorization) under the National Security Act justifying as a matter of law and the national interest, the support of paramilitary operations against the "Cuban-Sandinista support structure."

By February, the "covert" operation was no longer very covert, and the CIA informed the Intelligence Committees that the insurgents numbered 1000. On March 10, the Washington Post publicly revealed for the first time the authorization of the clandestine operations and declared that they were intended to destroy targets inside Nicaragua. Five days later, bridges were bombed deep in Nicaraguan territory by the Contras. During April, 1982, the Nicaraguan Government made a concerted effort to involve the U.S. in negotiations but was rebuffed. As military incursions escalated, "senior administration officiale declared that the U.S. strategy was to stall on negotiations and to wait until "internal unrest" against the Sandinista weakens their bargaining position. Not only has "internal unrest" failed to weaken the Sandinistas, the threat of invasion has strengthened the position of the Nicaraguan Government and united the people even more in support of their revolution.

A major watershed in the Central American crisis occurred with the report in Newweek in late October, 1982, when the American mass public learned for the first time that a rebel army numbering 4,000 had been established and supplied by the CIA as the lynchpin in its covert strategy to undermine and finally topple the Government of Nicaragua. The covert war had finally become overt, and the Reagan administration was immediately thrown on the defensive.

Congress became skeptical of administration claims that "clandestine" operations were intended only to stop the flow of arms into El Salvador. Legislation was introduced in the House to prohibit U.S. support for covert activities aimed at destabilizing Nicaragua. The Boland Amendment, passed by Congress and signed into law (by the President) in December, 1982, clearly stated that "no funds may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras." While this amendment indicated that Congressional concern existed and that the legislature would not write Reagan a blank check in Central America,
the lack of Congressional control over the CIA and its "covert" activities has rendered the Boland Resolution ineffective. It has not prevented the administration from continuing along the same path using the same rationalization, viz., the interdiction of arms. The only difference was that the amendment made it formally illegal for the U.S. to continue financially supporting activities aimed at the overthrow of the Sandinistas.

The ineffectiveness of the Boland Amendment soon became apparent. On April 1, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Intelligence Committee stated: "A growing number of my colleagues question whether the CIA is complying with the law." Representative Wyche Fowler Jr., Chair of the House Intelligence Oversight Committee, stated on April 14, upon his return from Central America, that the Boland Amendment was being consistently violated (17/4/83, Washington Post). Opposition to the Reagan policies in Congress continued to mount in various forms. There has been pressure put on the administration to negotiate under the Contadora plan, and, among other initiatives, Representative Michael Barnes, Chairman of the House Sub-committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, introduced a bill (H.R. 1873) which would have terminated all forms of U.S. support to the contras. President Reagan openly expressed his contempt for even these highly circumscribed Congressional actions. As he stated to reporters later on in May, "if Congress wants to tell us that we can give money and do the same things we've been doing...providing subsistence and so forth to these people directly and making it overt instead of covert that's all right with me."
find excuses to do nothing." (Washington Post, 5/29/83)

Meanwhile, Reagan continued to reject all attempts at opening up a political negotiation process. The Contras-a group, consisting of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama, failed in a fifth attempt in June to mediate between the conflicting parties in Central America. Largely due to the intransigence of the administration, this stone-wallig of the diplomatic process was underscored by the appointment of the National Commission on Future Policies Towards Central America headed by Henry Kissinger. The true task of the commission belies its name. It has been launched not as a policy making body but as a sop to Congressional opposition to militarism and as part of the administration's public relations campaign to persuade the American people and Congress that efforts to "counter communism in Central America are vital to American security," (27/7/83 In These Times)

Curiously, the Commission has undermined special envoy Richard Stone (formerly a lobbyist in the U.S. for the Guatemalan government of President Rios Montt). A Honduran official was quoted as saying: "Poor Stone seems to be left with his legs broken in the middle of the road. With Kissinger around who's going to want to talk to Stone about regional negotiations?"

But we needn’t rely on journalistic speculation to discern Reagan’s motives. In his speech to the conservative Longshoreman’s Union
in Florida, where he announced the commission, Reagan once again referred to the Contras as freedom fighters and called the Nicaraguan revolution, the "revolution of broken promises" whose "dictators" "are actively trying to destroy the budding democracy in neighbouring El Salvador." At the same time, the CIA submitted a new plan to support a Contra force of 12,000 to 15,000 with funds and materials. This corresponded to a new presidential "finding" in which the interdiction of arms was not even mentioned as a purpose for covert action. The purpose stated was to force changes in Nicaraguan policies, including support for guerrilla forces elsewhere in Central America. (Manchester Guardian, 7/24/83) The Kissinger Commission can thus be seen as a stalling tactic permitting a greater military build-up for open war.

The apogee of the Reagan policy in Central America must then be seen as the gunboat diplomacy and military maneuvers launched in the last week of July. As the Manchester Guardian (7/31/83) bluntly stated: "President Reagan, declaring that it would be 'extremely difficult' to reach a settlement in Central America while the Nicaraguan Government remains in power, has now set out by military intimidation to overthrow it. In this he is following the advice of his closest advisers, ... in particular that of Mrs. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who last week said she was not persuaded that the Sandinista revolu-

lution was not reversible and that the Nicaraguan people "have the will and determination to reverse it."

While no one can seriously believe any longer that the Reagan Administration has any desire to negotiate a settlement of its crisis in Central America, the Contadora members continued to strive for a peaceful solution, and received a public expression of support from Fidel Castro. The Nicaraguans have pointedly compared the latest U.S. moves to the events prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, and issued a still more flexible negotiating agenda, receiving, of course, no reply from the U.S.

On Friday, September 12, Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense, called for the "military defeat" of the guerrillas in El Salvador and went on to assert that the U.S. must "prevent consolidation of a Sandinista regime in Nicaragua."

Thus, the administration continues to flaunt its illegal policy in Central America in the face of Congress and the American people. The only effective response which Congress has been capable of mounting is the passage in the House of the Intelligence Authorizations Bill with a rerun of the Boland Resolution (the Boland-Zablocki Amendment) in an October 12 vote. As early as last May, House Intelligence Committee members stated that the resolution has been ineffective, and, in order to become law, it has to be approved by the Republican-controlled Senate, after
which it would be subject to presidential veto. Congress has so far been unable to demonstrate either the will or the capacity to stop the Reagan war machine in Central America.

As the Reagan Central American policy has evolved, it has manifested numerous contradictions—covert or overt assistance; interdiction of the arms flow vs. overthrowing the Sandinistas. In the end, the underlying motives and the real goals of the administration's policy have clearly emerged. The Reagan Administration is mounting an ever-escalating attack on Nicaragua, with the evident aim of destroying the Sandinista government. Indeed, this is the primary goal of Reagan’s present Central American policy. If there is no flow of arms to interdict, if the revolution in El Salvador continues to wax in the face of increased repression, the relentless pursuit of the Nicaraguan scapegoat is the sole alternative. Reagan wishes to destroy the new Nicaragua because it stands as a living testament to the monumental failures of U.S. policy in the region and as a beacon of hope for the struggling people of Central America.

Pierre LaRamee

NOT AGAIN!

Stop U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean.

MARCH ON WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 12.

FOR BUS INFO. CALL: 256-7293
At the closing of this legislative period of the Council of State, we can say without a doubt that democracy is being affirmed in the new Nicaragua.

The democracy that was conquered by the people in arms, led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front, and which was the historic reply to the other democracy.

Because our people lived centuries of exploitation and domination under the other democracy.

That was the democracy that denied the workers the right to organize unions and that favored the brutal exploitation of mine workers.

That was the democracy that considered as just the unmerciful exploitation of the peasants.

That was the democracy that kept people illiterate.

That was the democracy that denied our people health care and increased infant mortality.

That was the democracy that formed armies and police to kill popular protest, institutionalizing terror.

That was the democracy of theft and plunder....

That was the democracy of the demagogy and electoralism of the deputies and senators, risen from the ballot-boxes of the plutocratic, aristocratic minorities of the old Nicaragua who sold out their country.

That was the democracy of the anti-people congresses.

That was the democracy that received the support of succeeding United States Administrations during that period....
That was the democracy imposed by the Yankees when their Marines intervened to stain our country with blood in 1912.

That was the democracy that the Yankees defended when they again threw their Marines against Sandino in Nicaragua.

That was the democracy that they defended, arming the Somoza dictatorship up until the last minute.

Those were the votes, the ballot-boxes, the elections and the democracy that the people in rebellion destroyed and buried for all time on the 19th of July of 1979.

One hundred and sixty-two years had to go by from the time of Independence from Spain for us to reach, finally, the greatest democratic triumph of our history.

During that century and a half, the bases of the new democracy were being formed:

With the blood of more than 200 thousand Nicaraguans who were victims of the U.S. interventions of 1856, 1912 and 1926;

With the blood of the workers of the countryside and the city, shed when they protested the brutal exploitation to which they were subjected by Liberal and Conservative regimes;

With the blood of more than 50 thousand Nicaraguans spilled by the dictatorship of the Somozas;

With the blood, with the sweat of the people, with the sacrifices of the people, with the heroism of the people, the new democracy was being forged.

And this new democracy rose out of the popular ballot-boxes, made into barricades and trenches in the cities and in the interior.

This new democracy was the product of the unanimous and free vote of a whole people in rebellion and triumphant.

This new democracy has created a Council of State in which are represented and have a place to be represented all the social, political, economic and religious sectors of the new Nicaragua.

And this Council of State has debated new laws that are establishing the legal base of the new Nicaragua....

We are consolidating the revolutionary democracy, we are affirming the popular democracy conquered on July 19th, 1979.
And this new democracy in the new Nicaragua reduced the illiteracy level to 12.07 per cent in our country, a level that the old democracy in 162 years of domination had left at more than 50 per cent.

And this new democracy in the new Nicaragua, rescued for the nation its natural resources, up until then in the hands of foreign companies.

And this new democracy nationalized banking in order to put it at the service of national interests.

And this new democracy has redistributed the land recovered from the hands of the Somocistas and has promoted integral agrarian reform.

And this new democracy has taken health care to the most isolated corners of Nicaragua and has banished from the land diseases such as polio which was the scourge of our children.

And this new democracy has seen the formation of 1,751 new labor unions, 3,820 peasant cooperatives and 373 urban cooperatives.

And this new democracy has more than a million Nicaraguans studying.

And this new democracy has created its new armed forces which are the Army, the Police, the State Security, the Popular Militias which are the people defending the people and with them the new democracy.

And this new democracy has given property deeds to thousands of Nicaraguans who did not have a piece of land of their own where they could build their humble dwellings.

And this new democracy is hope, that is being molded by the will and action of workers, peasants, patriotic producers and owners, professionals, intellectuals, women, militia members, soldiers, young people and children of the new Nicaragua.

But we also should point out how this liberating feat of our people is threatened by those who have resolved to destabilize it in order to destroy it and then try to revive their democracy as it was in the best times of the Yankee intervention.

Only in this way can we explain the behavior of the present U.S. Administration, which, forgetting past errors, falls back on those same errors and encourages and supports military aggression, economic aggression and political aggression against Nicaragua.

Economic aggression, by eliminating aid to Nicaragua.

Economic aggression, pressuring Latin American and European governments to not cooperate with Nicaragua.
Political aggression, mounting defamatory campaigns and promoting internationally the political isolation of our revolution.

Military aggression, arming the Somocista ex-National Guards and involving Honduras as a base for military operations against Nicaragua....

And at this moment, not a day goes by in which there is not an attack in the border area:

One day it is a center of production burned;

Another day it is machinery that is set on fire;

And almost every day, it is a peasant murdered, a technician tortured and murdered, a health or education brigadier ambushed and murdered.

And in the height of absurdity and prepotent will, the aggressor complains and demands that we not protest, that we lower our rhetoric, that we not arm ourselves.

And we answer that we will continue to protest in international forums; that we will continue to be firm in our denunciations and that we will arm ourselves with whatever we feel is necessary to defend ourselves.

But we have not lost confidence in the peoples and governments of the world which have known how to identify, in the policies of the present U.S. Administration, policies that put humanity in real danger....

In these difficult circumstances, when some heads of state write private letters to President Reagan proposing plans that could be employed for future aggression against neighboring countries, we have not lost faith in the peoples of Central America. Neither have we lost faith in the people of the United States who have known how to confront, at the right opportunity, adventurist policies.

...Because like it or not, Mr. Reagan, Latin America and the Caribbean claim respect; Central America demands respect; Nicaragua requires respect.

Stop your irresponsible policies now and put your feet on the ground.
The only way to find a solution to these problems is through dialogue.
The only way to find peace is to end the use of force and the threat of the use of force.
The only way, the only route by which to find peace is through respect for other peoples, however small their nations may be....
November 8

Carlos Fonseca Amador, founding member and most influential leader of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation is killed in combat in 1976.

November 9
Wednesday, 7:30
GIAC

First of a two-talk series sponsored by the Green Star Coop on food and justice in Latin America. The first talk will be an overview of Latin America's food economy by Vicky Furio.

November 10
Thursday, 8pm
Uris Aud., Cornell

CUSLAR Film, Gaijin. Japanese immigrants to Brazil seek their fortune working on a coffee plantation, only to become virtual slaves. Prof. Tom Holloway will lead an informal discussion after the film.

Nov. 12
Saturday

MARCH ON WASHINGTON! Stop U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean. For info. call 256-7293.

Nov. 17
Thursday, 8pm
Uris Aud., Cornell

CUSLAR Film, State of Siege. Based on an actual kidnapping, this film shows revolutionaries gradually uncovering the role of a "special advisor" from the U.S. in their country.

November 30
Wednesday, 7:30pm
GIAC


December 1
Thursday, 8pm
Uris Aud., Cornell

CUSLAR film, One Way or Another. This Cuban film explores human relations, especially relations between the sexes, in post-revolutionary Cuba.