"Democratic Socialism" in Jamaica: The Failure of Reform

In 1972, the People's National Party, with Michael Manley as the candidate for Prime Minister, won the elections in Jamaica with 56% of the vote—the largest percentage of the electorate won by a single party up to that time. In 1976 the PNP, campaigning on a program of "Democratic Socialism," won again, pulling 56.8% of the vote. But in the 1980 the PNP lost the election with only 41% of the vote, the right-wing Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) winning 58% of the vote. This dramatic change of heart by the Jamaican people has been commonly attributed to the terror and confusion resulting from a well orchestrated destabilization campaign by the CIA, the local oligarchy, foreign corporate interests, and the U.S. press. Michael Manley’s new book Jamaica, Struggle in the Periphery (Third World Media Limited, London, 1982) presents this view. Clearly written and with sometimes lofty prose, the book is primarily an account of the eight tumultuous years of PNP rule. As a personal account it makes for interesting reading, but as an explanation and analysis of the program and policies of his government and of the social context in which the PNP's "Democratic Socialism" failed, Manley’s book is less than satisfactory.

In this article I would like to briefly discuss the PNP's program of change, drawing from those sections of the book relevant to the discussion. Having done this, I will address the question of what caused Manley's fall.

In Chapter Four of the book, Manley outlines the four basic "commitments" of the PNP's program: (1) "to create an economy that would be more independent of foreign control and more responsive to the needs of the majority of the people at home"; (2) "to work for an egalitarian society both in terms of opportunity and also in the deeper
sense of a society in which people felt that they were of equal worth and value"; (3) "to develop a truly democratic society in which democracy was more than the attempt to manipulate votes every five years"; (4) "to help, indeed accelerate, the process by which Jamaicans were retraceing the steps of their history". It was this last "commitment" which the Manley administration was most successful in fulfilling by lifting the previously existing ban on radical and Black Power literature and through government-sponsored art workshops and events. The other three "commitments" were to be translated into concrete socio-political conditions through the following economic/political reforms:

Nationalization Public utilities were nationalized and, in what constituted one of the most important actions of the Manley government, 51% of all bauxite (Jamaica's leading export) mining operations were bought by the government. In addition, a "production levy" on the bauxite mined was established in 1974. This production tax increased government revenues in 1974 by $175 million.

Agrarian Reform In 1968, 43% of the country's arable land was concentrated in a mere 15% of the total number of farms. At the same time, the majority of Jamaica's farmers, occupying 78% of the total number of farms, had to make do with only 15% of the land, most of it of poor quality. The PNP promised to "embark upon the first major land reform program in Jamaican history". Project Land Lease was designed to make available to poor peasants the idle lands owned by the large landowners. On some of these lands Food Farms, organized as cooperatives, were set up to help reduce Jamaica's food imports.

Property Tax This was one of the most important mechanisms of the PNP government for redistributing wealth. Before the reform, taxes paid on property were based on its original value, and any development or improvement on the property (usually land) after it was bought went untaxed. The new Property Tax was calculated taking into account any development or construction done on the property, as well as the original value.

Education, Health and Infrastructure A literacy campaign was undertaken in which 200,000 Jamaicans (out of a population of 2.25 million) acquired basic literacy skills. Free education was established in public elementary schools and high schools. A "network of primary care clinics was established, each feeding into comprehensive [district] clinics and finally into a regional hospital. Remarkable advances in general health and particularly in child nutrition were achieved." The PNP's plan of reform also called for the development of "internal linkages", that is, the development of the necessary infrastructure (raw materials and industrial inputs) so as to carry out a successful import-substitut-
tion program. As part of the "internal linkages" plan, new roads, electric power lines and water-pipes were built in the interior of the island, where none had been available before.

Workers' Participation A "Workers' Participation Program" was introduced in state-owned industries, which fostered the formation of workers' committees at the shop floor level and which allowed workers' representatives to participate in the Board of Directors of the enterprises. In addition to this legislation, a new minimum wage law was established, regulating work hours at eight per day and setting a minimum wage equivalent of $22 per week. This was the first minimum wage law in Jamaica's history!

All of these reform programs constituted the meat of "Democratic Socialism". But underneath the façade of slogans about socialism and workers' participation lay what Norman Girvan and Richard Bernal, FNP activists who worked in the National Planning Agency of the government, have characterized as "a lack of a coherent economic strategy which integrates political philosophy with economic management and popular mobilization". The lack of clarity in the FNP was particularly critical with regard to the issue of class struggle/class alliance and the role of the state in bringing about social change. These two issues deeply divided the FNP into two factions: the left wing and the right wing.

Referring to the official policy on the FNP, The Principles and Objectives of the People's National Party, Manley writes: "Emphasizing the role of the class alliance, it stated unequivocally that it is the interest of the working class which must predominate. With respect to the mixed economy it asserted with equal clarity that the public sector must play the leading role in a mixed economy of which the private sector is to be a vibrant part". Compounding the lack of clarity, and as a result of it, was the lack of power to make the mixed economy work, to establish a class alliance in which the working class predominate.

The business sector was willing to cooperate with, and even support, those measures that benefitted it. It supported the 'nationalization' of the bauxite mines because with the revenue from the "production levy" the government established the Capital De-
The Development Bank (CDB). The CDB was supposed to make low-interest loans available to the business community to foster local development. Not surprisingly, most of the loans made at first went to already established private businesses, such as construction companies and a television importing firm. When the government pressed the CDB to lend money to small-scale businesses and to the peasant cooperatives, the support of the business sector began to dry up. The revenue from the "production levy" was not enough to finance projects for the working and lower-middle classes as well as for the already established bourgeoisie. Nor were the bauxite companies willing to cooperate. They retaliated by cutting back on production by 36% between 1975 and 1976, thus reducing the revenue available to the government. As a result of this, the government in 1979 decreased the production levy and surrendered even further by linking the decrease to an increase in production!

Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the Agrarian Reform was an ad hoc measure rather than a carefully planned attempt to transform the agrarian economy. The big landowners were able to find many ways to avoid the law, so that only 28,700 acres were acquired by the government for distribution. The farm cooperatives, without good land, with inadequate technical assistance and poor organization, lost money; and the government closed them down.

One of the leading causes of the shortage of capital which faced the government in 1977 was the flight of capital from the country, estimated at $300 million for that year. The government had neither the means nor the political will to control the situation. Despite the almost total exhaustion of central reserves in the Central Bank of Jamaica, the failure of many of the reform programs, and a destabilization campaign, the people endorsed the PNP and the promise of "Democratic Socialism" in the 1976 elections. But at the same time the country was experiencing a financial disaster due to the conjuncture of several factors: rising oil prices, a decline in bauxite production, the flight of local capital, an almost total stop in the flow of tourists from the U.S. (Jamaica's second most important source of foreign exchange), and a decline in the amount of foreign private capital flowing into the economy. All of this meant a net deficit of $254 million in exchange reserves and the danger of the economy's coming to a halt. It meant also that many of the reform programs, especially those in health and education, could no longer be continued since they had been originally financed with foreign capital which the government had borrowed. The Jamaican government decided to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. Manley writes that his government had no choice, even
after the PNP considered an alternative "People's Production Plan" presented by the left wing of the party. The conditions that the IMF attached to its sign of approval, necessary before it and other international lending institutions would lend money, were of the sort that have made the IMF infamous: a 40% devaluation of the Jamaican dollar, drastic cuts in government spending for social welfare programs, increased taxes, and a limit in wage increases of 15%, well below the rate of growth of inflation. In accepting the conditions, the PNP and the government in effect turned back on the promise of "Democratic Socialism", on the call for mass mobilization and on many of the gains made by the working class. In 1979 the PNP's Annual Conference overwhelmingly decided to break with the IMF, which the government did in 1980. But by then, the damage to the economy and to the support for Democratic Socialism had been done.

It has been argued by many that Manley and the PNP were the victims of a destabilization campaign. Manley says so in the chapter entitled "Destabilisation Triumph". And indeed, the misinformation campaign carried out by Jamaica's leading newspaper, The Gleaner, the cutbacks in U.S. and international aid, the JLP's constant propaganda blitz about communism and Cuba's take-over of Jamaica, right-wing terrorist activities that claimed more than 500 lives between July and October 1980, and a threat of a coup by the armed forces did much to contribute to the atmosphere of terror and anarchy which preceded the October 1980 elections. But there was a material basis for the terror and anarchy, and that was the state of the economy. The GNP fell 16% between 1974 and 1980; between 1972 and 1980 real income fell 25% with the cost of living rising 32%, and unemployment rose from 25% to 31%. The Jamaican working class was much worse off in 1980 than in 1972. And not only were the workers and the peasants economically hurt, they were angry and confused. For what had they been mobilized? What had happened to "Democratic Socialism"?

Manley writes: "From the start one of our deepest concerns was how to mobilize the people for the kind of effort which alone could make Jamaica prosperous, permit all its people to share in that prosperity and create a genuinely independent nation." But was the business sector willing to share? Were the big landowners willing to let go of their unused land? Were the bauxite corporations willing to operate with Jamaica's benefit in mind? Here we have the crux of Manley's confusion, which is at the same time the lure of populism. Manley's attempts at reforms within the capitalist system fomented the anger of the ruling elite and of foreign interests without fundamentally altering the balance of power between the working class and the elite. And it was that
sector which owned the industries, which decided where and when to invest, and which controlled the labor of the majority. State ownership of the majority shares in the bauxite mines could not prevent the bauxite companies from cutting back production. The issue of control over production was not addressed.

Mobilizing the masses is not like turning a water faucet on and off. They cannot be called out just for rallies and then told that they cannot seize land from the big landowners. At any rate, one cannot do that for long and still retain the trust of the people. Reforms, if they are to be more than a means of channeling discontent, have to give power to those they are supposed to benefit, so that the people can be prepared for the long fight against poverty. Reforms, to be successful, have to be a part of a comprehensive attempt to restructure society—something the Agrarian Reform in Jamaica was not. While most of the economy is controlled by private interests, the call for a workers' controlled society remains just that, a call.

Underdevelopment, opposition to change by the oligarchy and corporate interests, the aspirations of the people—these do not permit half-baked solutions. Michael Manley did not understand that then and does not seem to understand now.

José Lobo
Carlos Escoria is a minister of the Assembly of God Church. He works in the Managua neighborhood of San Judas, and with CEPRES (Ecumenical Committee for Social Responsibility in the Revolution), an organization working to sharpen Christians' reflections and their participation in the reconstruction process. Before the 1978 insurrection, he was working in the Masaya Indian community of Monimbo, the site of one of the earliest and most courageous anti-Somoza uprisings in Nicaragua. Many of Carlos' parishioners were killed in the insurrection.

As part of a tour sponsored by the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, Reverend Escoria visited Ithaca on March 10th and 11th to share his experiences as a church person involved in the Nicaraguan revolution. At the time of his visit, the church in Nicaragua was a focus of media attention in the U.S. because of the Pope's recent visit to Central America.

Q: How did you get involved in the struggle against Somoza?
CE: I got involved in the support of the insurrection as part of my experience as a pastor in Masaya. I began to see very specific instances of suffering. For example, the young people who were being tortured came to the Church, took off their clothes, and showed me scars on their legs and backs, and where their fingernails had been torn out. I received visits from the mothers and wives of persons who were in jail, had disappeared or died. I also remember a visit from a national guardsman whose conscience troubled him. He told me, "I don't know what to do. I can't stand it because the tortures I see are very brutal and the commander of the national guard ordered me to torture the young men, and I believe that it is not right. Some are killed by repeated blows. When I don't do it, the commander says that I am not a man."

It was this type of situation, and also the tremendous poverty of the people that convinced me that it was necessary to make a stronger commitment to those working for change in the system.

Q: And the same thing happened with other pastors?
CE: Yes, the same thing happened, when we saw the people were suffering too much. Our witness to this suffering made us sympath-
ize, and motivated us to take a definite position of commitment to the revolution. We realized that it was necessary to throw out Somoza and the national guard because there was no other alternative.

**Q:** Personally, how do you see the Sandinista Front? What does the Front mean to you, as a Christian and as a revolutionary?

**CE:** For me the Sandinista Front is the organized expression of the aspirations of the people. My personal relations basically are of friendship, sympathy and support. I'm not a member of the Sandinista Front. I would say that I'm a Sandinista at heart because I love Sandinism.

**Q:** Who inside Nicaragua opposes the Sandinista Government?

**CE:** The business sector, the organized opposition, and also two small labor unions, which are actually business unions, are in opposition. Apart from this, there isn't opposition in Nicaragua. But there are people who don't feel comfortable with the revolution, for understandable reasons. That is to say there have been errors committed by the government—errors which any inexperienced government would commit, especially a government that represents the poor. But these people who complain aren't in the opposition—they are only in some disagreement. The only organized opposition is that of the business sector and a sector of the Catholic hierarchy and the ex-National Guard.

**Q:** In the American press, there are reports of 6,000 Cubans in Nicaragua. Have you seen them?

**CE:** Yes, I've seen some Cubans, but I don't believe there are 6,000. But if there were, what is the problem? They are teachers, doctors. They are people who are helping to reconstruct the country. Cuban engineers have come to reconstruct the bridges that were destroyed during the revolution. So we don't see where the problem is.

**R:** A poor, small country can't have the luxury to reject help from whoever extends it if they have the intention of helping to reconstruct the country.

**Q:** Yesterday in the *New York Times,* there was an article that said that there were Cubans in high positions in the government of Nicaragua.

**CE:** This simply isn't true. The high positions in the government are for Nicaraguans, and if there is a high post for any foreigners, it is a technical post which no one from Nicaragua can fill.

**Q:** What do you think of the Cuban Revolution, and the situation of the church in Cuba?

**CE:** I haven't been in Cuba. The information I have comes from friends and pastors and priests from Nicaragua who have gone many times. I've talked to them personally. We feel that the revolution in Cuba is very similar to that in Nicaragua and in this sense we identify with and have affection for the Cuban Revolution.
But in the case of Cuba, the revolution happened when the Catholic Church had not yet experienced Vatican II nor the Bishops Congresses of Medellin and Puebla. So, in the case of Cuba, the church was very backward in social doctrine. Also the church in Cuba isn't a church with popular roots—it is a church of elites. The Catholic Church was the religion of the dominant classes, of the minority. The majority of the people were never really with the Church. So, when the revolution triumphed, there was a much more radical confrontation between religion and revolution in Cuba than in Nicaragua. 

Q: Do you believe that the Sandinistas have made mistakes in their relations with the Church?
CE: Yes. Mistakes have been made on both sides. First, I believe that the Sandinista Front doesn't understand religious phenomena—which are so complex—and perhaps one of its mistakes was not to make a study of so complex a situation. And so, there isn't a good knowledge of religion—not of the Catholics and much less of the evangelicals. But I see an error in the Catholic Church that is worse, and that is in the negative attitude toward dialogue. The government has asked for a dialogue many times, and they always make excuses—that their agendas are very full, another time. They don't give a good explanation. Really, they don't want to dialogue. This error puts in doubt the morality and spiritual force of the church.

Q: In this country, we hear charges of persecution of the Church in Nicaragua, but we do not hear what the specific char-

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A Billboard in Managua

The beginning of the good news of Jesus Christ, Son of God

Jesus Christ

Now I can read your name

At the hour of literacy we shall be with Christ
ges are. What are the specific charges being made against the government relating to persecution of the Church?

CE: The thing is, I don't know either, living there in Nicaragua. I don't know of any specific case in which officially and in a premeditated form the government has committed an act of persecution against the Catholic Church, or any other church.

Perhaps I should go back and remember that about 7 or 8 months ago, there was a confiscation of some Protestant churches. The government, even though it wasn't officially responsible for the confiscations, made a rectification and gave back the churches and invited the directors of those churches to have a dialogue. It was the popular organizations that acted on their own, and the Sandinista Front ordered them to stop this wave of taking churches. There is a process of dialogue and deepening communication and mutual education on both sides to try to correct errors. But let us not confuse the irregular actions of revolutionary groups that have acted on their own with official government policy.

On the other hand, there is a form of religious persecution in Nicaragua. It is an official policy of the Catholic Church to selectively persecute the priests that have made a preferential option for the poor. I could mention specific cases in which the Archbishop Obando y Bravo has made transfers of religious people in the country. For example, in 1980, the sister Maria Harman, a missionary from the U.S., was asked by the Archbishop to leave Managua. It didn't happen, because the superior of the order in the U.S. asked him to put the request in writing, which he wouldn't do. Also, the father Manuel Batalla, a Spanish Dominican, was removed from his parish in spite of the demonstrations of the people, who marched through the streets of Managua. He was removed because he loaned his church for literacy classes and adult education.

Q: When the Pope was in Nicaragua, he denounced the so-called, "popular church," which could be considered a fulfillment of the Church's "option for the poor." Yet when he was in Haiti, the Pope spoke of the need for the Church to work with the poor. How do you explain the Pope's very different messages in Nicaragua and in Haiti?

CE: First, his background in Poland weighs heavily. He, consciously or unconsciously, identifies the problem in Poland as a situation similar to that in Nicaragua. And so, being human, he's influenced by his own background--his experience in Poland. Second, the position the Pope has taken in every country of Central America is strongly influenced by the position of the local archbishop of that country. In Nicaragua, he reflected the position of the Archbishop Miguel Obando y
Bravo, which is a position of confrontation with the Nicaraguan Revolution.

In this way I can explain the position of the Pope, but on the other hand it is a contradictory position because in Haiti and Costa Rica he said that it is necessary to struggle for social justice. In Nicaragua, the popular sectors of the church have found a practical way to do exactly what the pope is saying, but he says, "No, don't do it." He says they shouldn't do it but says it in a negative manner and doesn't say what is the practical alternative. The big problem with Christianity is the excessive abstraction—generalities and ambiguities.

Q: The Pope said that the popular church is "dangerous and absurd." How is the popular church going to react?
CE: It isn't going to have a public reaction, but yes, there is a feeling of sadness.

I want to explain that the term "popular church" is inadequate—it is used to isolate the church of the poor and to discredit it. Yes, we can say it is a sector of the church, not a doctrinal or structural division, but a new reflection of the word of God.


2 Vatican II was a conference of the Pope and the Cardinals of the Catholic Church in 1962-65 which addressed the issue of the church's role in bringing about social justice. After Vatican II, and the conferences of Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia, and Puebla, Mexico, the Catholic Church in Latin America became much more committed "to making an option for working with the poor."

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In Memorium
Dr. Melida Anaya Montes
1928-1983

On April 6, Commander Ana Maria was stabbed to death by assassins while in Managua, Nicaragua. At the time of her death, she was second spokesperson for the FPL (Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion Farabundo Marti). Along with Salvador Cayetano Carpio, she was one of the original leaders of the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador, and had played an important role in the unification of the five member organizations comprising the FMLN. Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge claims to have evidence that those responsible for her brutal murder were trained by the CIA.

"Forever Onward Until Victory!"
CUSLAR ANNOUNCES

A MEDICAL AID CAMPAIGN

FOR EL SALVADOR

Between April 25th and May 14, CUSLAR will be participating in a national campaign to raise money for the clinics operated by the FMLN. These clinics are now providing the people in the guerilla-controlled zones with a level of health care they have never had before. The Salvadorean people's determination to build a better life is embodied in these clinics, and they deserve our support.

As part of the campaign we have invited to Ithaca Dr. Charles Clements to discuss his experiences in El Salvador. He will give a public presentation on May 2nd at 8pm in Hollis E. Cornell Aud. in Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University. Dr. Clements, a former Air Force pilot in Southeast Asia, returned from the war to study medicine. After working for several years with Salvadorean refugees in California he found "that the rhetoric of the Administration was increasingly like Vietnam". In 1982 Dr. Clements, a Quaker, went to El Salvador to work in the zones controlled by the FDR/FMLN. In the past year he has been responsible for the health care of 10,000 civilians in the Guazapa front. In addition to actual medical care, he developed training programs for medics, public health campaigns, and curriculum for health education in schools. He has also acted as a liaison between the FMLN and the International Red Cross for the exchange of prisoners of war in Guazapa. Currently, Dr. Clements is in the United States seeking funds for medical supplies and as an American witness to the present situation in El Salvador.
CUSLAR members will be showing a slide show on the health problems of El Salvador and on the need for medical aid to a variety of campus and community groups. By using the slide show as a focus for discussion, we hope not only to raise funds for medical aid but to increase understanding as to the human effects of U.S. support for the Salvadorean government.

Please call us at 256-7293 if you know of any organizations or groups of people who might be interested in seeing the slide show. We need your help to make this campaign a success.

The map shows the areas of El Salvador which are controlled by the guerrillas and where popular clinics are in operation for ministering to the needs of the local populations.

The CUSLAR Newsletter provides CUSLAR members and other concerned individuals with the opportunity to present information and analysis on topics pertaining to Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, the positions of the articles in the newsletter do not necessarily reflect the positions taken by CUSLAR as an organization.
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<td>April 15</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>&quot;Social Articulation as a Condition for Equitable Growth,&quot; a talk by Alain de Janvry, Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. 12:15-2:00 pm, 157 East Sibley Hall.</td>
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<td>April 15</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>&quot;The Impact of American-ism on Latin Culture,&quot; talk by Professor Hector Velez, Department of Sociology, Cornell. Part of Latin Weekend Activities. 8 pm, 700 Clark Hall.</td>
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<td>April 17</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Dance Troupe, BORINQUEN DANCE CO. Part of Latin Weekend Activities. 7-9 pm, Memorial Room, WSH.</td>
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<td>April 19</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>&quot;View from the World Bank,&quot; talk by Nicolas Ardito Barletta, Vice President of the World Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean. Part of the Symposium, &quot;The Debt Crisis: Economy and Policy in Latin America.&quot; Kaufmann Auditorium, Goldwin Smith Hall, 8 pm.</td>
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<td>April 20</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>&quot;Venezuela, Latin America and the U.S.,&quot; talk by Marcial Perez-Chiriboga, Venezuela's Ambassador to the U.S. Part of the &quot;Debt Crisis&quot; symposium. 8 pm. Kaufmann Auditorium, Golwin Smith.</td>
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<td>April 25</td>
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<td>Information table and display on Nicaragua. Front steps of Willard Straight, 10am-3pm.</td>
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<td>April 26</td>
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<td>&quot;Mexico,&quot; talk by Jose Luis Reyna, Director, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico City and Salvador Kalifa-Assad, chief economist, Alfa Industrial Group, Monterrey, Mexico. Part of &quot;Debt Crisis&quot; symposium. 4 pm Kaufmann Aud.</td>
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<td>April 27</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>&quot;Brazil,&quot; talk by Luciano Coutinho, Professor of Economics, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Brazil. Part of &quot;Debt Crisis&quot; symposium. 4 pm Kaufmann Auditorium</td>
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April 28
Thursday
CUSLAR Films: *Communique from Argentina.* This exciting autobiography of Argentine activist Lili Massafero, is illuminated by her understanding of Peronism and her special relationship to Eva Peron. *With the Cuban Women.* A documentary of Cuba’s "revolution within a revolution," this film examines, sometimes satirically, the reaction of men to the profound transformation in the social status of women in Cuba. 8 pm Uris Auditorium.

April 29-31
Friday to Sunday
Events presented by Performing Artists for Nuclear Disarmament, featuring nationally acclaimed Bread and Puppet Theatre. For more info., call Jeff, 256-5176.

May 1
Sunday
May Day. "Workers of all Countries, Unite!"

May 2
Monday
Talk by Dr. Charles Clements on his experiences while working as a doctor in the liberated zones of El Salvador. See page 12.

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**THE SYSTEM**

Extermination plan: destroy the grass, pull up every last little living thing by the roots, sprinkle the earth with salt. Afterwards, kill all memory of the grass. To colonize consciences, suppress them; to suppress them, empty them of the past. Wipe out all testimony to the fact that in this land there ever existed anything other than silence, jails and tombs.

It is forbidden to remember.

Prisoners are organized into work gangs. At night they are forced to whitewash the phrases of protest that in other times covered the walls of the city.

The steady pelting of rain on the walls begins to dissolve the white paint. And little by little the stubborn words reappear.

From *Days and Nights of Love and War,* by Eduardo Galeano, author of *Open Veins of Latin America*

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**STREET WAR, SOUL WAR**

I pursue the enemy voice that has ordered me to be sad. At times I feel that joy is a crime of high treason, and I am guilty of the privilege of being alive and free.

Then it helps me to remember what chief Huilica said in Peru, speaking before the ruins. "They came here. They even smashed the rocks. They wanted to make us disappear. But they have not been able to, because we are alive, and that is the main thing." And I think that Huilica was right. To be alive: a small victory. To be alive, that is: to be capable of joy, despite the goodbyes and the crimes, so that exile will be a testimony to another possible country.

The task ahead—building our country—cannot be accomplished with bricks of shit. Will we be of any use if, when we return, we are broken?

Joy takes more courage than grief. In the end, we are accustomed to grief.
WHAT IS CUSLAR?

The Committee on U.S./Latin American Relations (CUSLAR) is a Cornell University-based group which works in Ithaca and the surrounding areas to promote a greater understanding of Latin America and the Caribbean. We are particularly concerned with the role of the United States in influencing the social, political, and economic conditions of the region. Within this context we support the right of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean for self-determination and their efforts to free themselves from a legacy of colonialism, underdevelopment, and oppression.

Our calendar of events includes a very popular film series, speakers, and panel discussions on current issues. Our office is a resource center, with a large variety of up-to-date publications including periodicals, pamphlets, books, slideshows, and materials from national and international sources. CUSLAR receives ongoing information from various national solidarity networks, as well as other upstate groups.

The CUSLAR office is in G-29, Anabel Taylor Hall, at Cornell (phone: 256-7293). The office is open to the community on weekdays; weekly meetings are held on Mondays at 5pm in the CUSLAR office. Come join us. There is much work to be done and we welcome participation of individuals as well as local organizations. Bring us your suggestions and comments on our programs and written materials.

CUSLAR is in the midst of a genuine financial emergency, and contributions to cover the cost of activities and projects such as this newsletter are urgently needed. A small donation will enable us to send you the newsletter and other CUSLAR announcements on a regular basis. If the truly destitute send us a name and campus address, we will, however, gladly send the newsletter monthly for free.

Name___________________________
Address_________________________
I'd like to receive the CUSLAR newsletter
I'd like more information on CUSLAR. Please call me at

Here is my contribution to keeping CUSLAR afloat: $_____

Mail to CUSLAR, G-29 Anabel Taylor Hall, Cornell U., Ithaca 14853, or drop off at our film showings or information tables.